How Naturalistic Evolution Undermines Its Own Basis for Trust in Our Epistemic Faculties

By Ajit Krishna Dasa

Given naturalistic evolution, the chances that our cognitive faculties are genuinely reliable for apprehending truth appear low or practically indistinguishable from unreliability. Here’s how this likelihood unfolds under naturalistic assumptions:

Survival Advantage vs. Truth Tracking

Evolution by natural selection favors traits that enhance survival and reproductive success, not necessarily those that yield true beliefs. Our cognitive faculties may have evolved to support survival rather than to track truth. This means that while some beliefs may coincide with reality, the evolutionary process itself provides no inherent guarantee that our faculties are truth-oriented.

Behavioral Utility Over Epistemic Accuracy

Evolution selects primarily for survival-enhancing behaviors rather than truth-accurate beliefs. A belief system that prompts advantageous behaviors is useful even if the beliefs themselves are false. This suggests that any alignment between survival-oriented beliefs and truth-tracking faculties is incidental, not guaranteed.

Epistemic Unreliability as Practical Unreliability

If naturalistic evolution alone accounts for our cognitive faculties, there’s no reason to assume they are reliable in tracking truth. Philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues that, on naturalism, the probability that our faculties are reliable is low or inscrutable. Furthermore, if our faculties lack the capacity to confirm their reliability, they are practically unreliable. Reliability includes not only the potential for truth-tracking but also the ability to confirm that alignment with truth. If we can’t verify our faculties’ reliability, then in any meaningful, practical sense, they are effectively unreliable.

Self-Referential Uncertainty as a Form of Unreliability

Since we would be using our own faculties to verify their reliability, we encounter a circular problem. If our faculties cannot establish their own reliability, this inability reflects a crucial deficiency, as reliable faculties would necessarily need a self-corrective mechanism to confirm their accuracy. Without this, we are left in a position where any belief in our faculties’ reliability is a matter of chance rather than rational assurance.

So far, while our cognitive faculties might theoretically align with truth, if we can’t confirm this due to the limitations of the faculties themselves, then they are effectively unreliable. From a naturalistic standpoint, this renders our cognitive faculties functionally no more trustworthy than random chance, undermining the rationality of our knowledge claims. This issue poses a significant problem for a worldview relying solely on naturalistic evolution as the foundation of human cognition, since it fails to secure a basis for epistemic certainty.

The practical unreliability of our epistemic faculties under a naturalistic framework brings us to an even deeper issue: the consequences of a self-refuting epistemology.

When a worldview’s epistemology is self-refuting—especially one grounded solely in naturalistic evolution—it contradicts the very standards it claims are necessary for acquiring knowledge or truth. This internal inconsistency leads to several profound issues:

Epistemic Incoherence

A self-refuting epistemology is inherently incoherent, as it fails to meet its own standards for truth or justification. If a worldview based on naturalistic evolution insists on specific criteria for knowledge but cannot satisfy them itself, it undermines its own authority to make reliable claims about reality.

Loss of Justification

In a worldview based solely on naturalistic evolution, any claims to knowledge are unjustified by its own standards. For instance, if such a worldview asserts that only empirically verified knowledge is valid, yet this assertion itself is not empirically verifiable, it lacks internal consistency. This results in a framework where knowledge claims are effectively groundless, leaving us without a rational basis for trusting our beliefs.

Skeptical Collapse

A self-refuting epistemology rooted in naturalistic evolution leads to radical skepticism, eroding confidence in any claims it might make. Without a reliable foundation for knowing, such a worldview becomes mired in self-doubt and skepticism, leaving adherents unable to confidently distinguish between true and false beliefs or know that truth is even accessible.

Practical Impotence

Without a justified basis for knowledge, a worldview grounded in naturalistic evolution cannot provide effective guidance for action, decision-making, or ethical judgment. Lacking the means to confirm the reliability of its own foundations, it leaves followers adrift, unable to rely on any clear path for making sense of experience or moral choice.

Need for a Stable Foundation

The self-refuting nature of a naturalistic evolution-based epistemology suggests a need for an alternative epistemological foundation—one that can coherently justify knowledge and avoid self-contradiction. This opens the door to seeking a worldview with a more stable and consistent basis for truth and understanding.

In sum, a worldview with a self-refuting epistemology, especially one reliant on naturalistic evolution, ultimately collapses under its own contradictions. This highlights the importance of a coherent, self-consistent foundation for any robust understanding of truth and reality.