Are We All Born Atheists?

Are newborn babies really atheists? A Vaiṣṇava presuppositional response argues that our reliance on logic, truth, and morality points toward an inherent knowledge of Kṛṣṇa—even before we consciously recognize Him.

The Claim: Everyone Is Born an Atheist

A popular atheist argument claims that we are all born atheists. Nobody is born believing in God, we are told. Religious belief is something acquired later through upbringing, education, and cultural influence. Without such influences, we would supposedly remain atheists.

Here, an atheist is defined not as someone who believes that God does not exist, but simply as someone who lacks belief that God exists. According to this definition, even a newborn baby qualifies as an atheist. Since babies cannot consciously express or demonstrate belief in God, proponents of this argument assume that they lack such belief and conclude that everyone begins life as an atheist.

At first glance, this may seem reasonable. Newborn babies cannot discuss God’s existence, evaluate religious arguments, or express theological convictions. But we must distinguish between what a child can consciously articulate and what the child already knows, presupposes, or relies upon. The absence of explicit belief does not necessarily establish the absence of underlying knowledge.

Consider a newborn baby. It experiences hunger and satisfaction, and responds differently to these conditions. It can also distinguish familiar sensory experiences from unfamiliar ones. Research has demonstrated, for example, that newborns can recognize and prefer their mother’s voice. The child has never studied identity, difference, or the laws of logic, yet it is already responding to a world in which things possess definite identities and can be distinguished from one another.

Hunger is not the same as satisfaction. The mother’s voice is not the same as an unfamiliar voice. The baby does not need to formulate the law of identity or the law of non-contradiction to function within a reality in which these principles hold. These elementary responses should not be confused with conscious logical reasoning, but they illustrate that our engagement with an ordered and intelligible reality begins long before we can explain the principles involved.

As children develop, their cognitive abilities become more sophisticated. They acquire language, recognize relationships, form expectations, and draw conclusions. Long before they receive formal instruction in logic or mathematics, they are already operating with capacities that make such instruction possible.

This raises an important distinction. We do not first learn the laws of logic and then begin living in a world governed by them. We already live within that order, and only later learn to recognize and formulate its principles.

The same distinction is relevant to knowledge of God. The fact that a newborn cannot consciously articulate belief in God does not establish that the child possesses no inherent knowledge of Him. Nor does it demonstrate that religious education introduces something entirely foreign to human nature.

There is also a deeper philosophical question. What ultimately makes the logical principles, moral obligations, and intelligible reality upon which human cognition depends possible? We use these things before we can explain them, and we continue to use them even when we disagree about their ultimate foundation.

From a Vaiṣṇava presuppositional perspective, that foundation is God. This leads to the central argument of this article: We can sincerely say that we do not believe in God, yet we continue to live, think, and reason in ways that presuppose His existence. Our conscious beliefs may deny God, but the fundamental conditions of knowledge upon which we depend ultimately point toward Him.

The Vaiṣṇava Position: We Already Know Kṛṣṇa

According to Vaiṣṇava philosophy, we are not material organisms that gradually develop consciousness and perhaps acquire religious beliefs. We are eternal conscious souls (jīvas), eternally related to the Supreme Personality of Godhead, Śrī Kṛṣṇa. Śrī Caitanya Mahāprabhu explains in Caitanya-caritāmṛta (Madhya 20.108) that the living entity is constitutionally an eternal servant of Kṛṣṇa: jīvera ‘svarūpa’ haya—kṛṣṇera ‘nitya-dāsa’. Our relationship with Kṛṣṇa is therefore not created by religious upbringing. It is an eternal feature of our existence.

Caitanya-caritāmṛta (Madhya 22.107) further explains that love for Kṛṣṇa is eternally established within the heart and manifests when consciousness is purified. The soul does not originally exist in ignorance of Kṛṣṇa. It possesses an eternal relationship with Him and an inherent spiritual awareness of that relationship. If this is true, however, why do so many people sincerely believe that they know nothing about God?

The answer is that they have forgotten Him. Śrīmad-Bhāgavatam 11.2.37 describes how the living entity, having turned away from the Supreme Lord, forgets its constitutional position under the influence of māyā. But forgetfulness is not the same as the destruction of knowledge. The conditioned soul may have forgotten Kṛṣṇa so thoroughly that it no longer consciously recognizes Him, but its eternal relationship with Him remains unchanged.

Nor does the covering of consciousness eliminate our dependence upon Kṛṣṇa. As He explains in Bhagavad-gītā 15.15, He is situated within everyone’s heart, and remembrance, knowledge, and forgetfulness come from Him. Our ability to think and reason therefore depends upon Him even when we use that very ability to deny His existence.

The distinction is between what we consciously profess and what we necessarily presuppose. A person may sincerely claim to lack belief in God while continuing to rely upon realities whose existence and intelligibility ultimately depend upon Him. From the Vaiṣṇava perspective, this dependence is one manifestation of the deeper knowledge that material conditioning has concealed.

This does not mean that every atheist secretly entertains a conscious theological conviction. Some may consciously suppress knowledge that threatens their desire for independence, while others may experience their unbelief as entirely sincere and unproblematic. In either case, the Vaiṣṇava position is that the soul’s original knowledge has not been destroyed. It has been covered, and its continuing presence can be recognized indirectly through the way human beings think, reason, and understand reality.

The Impossibility of the Contrary

Our argument is not simply that God provides one possible explanation for human knowledge. We maintain that without God, the fundamental conditions required for knowledge cannot ultimately be accounted for. This is the central concern of the presuppositional argument sometimes called the impossibility of the contrary.

Consider the laws of logic. Every person who reasons presupposes that logical principles are valid. The law of non-contradiction, for example, states that a proposition cannot be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. This principle is not a personal preference, a social convention, or a physical object. Its validity does not depend upon whether anyone believes in it, and it does not change when human brains or societies change.

How can such universal and necessary principles be accounted for in a universe that is ultimately nothing more than matter and impersonal physical processes? Physical processes describe what happens, whereas logical laws establish which conclusions necessarily follow from particular premises and which forms of reasoning are valid or invalid. A brain can produce a thought, but describing the physical processes producing that thought does not establish whether the thought is logically valid. The physical occurrence of thinking and the rational justification of thought are different matters.

Evolutionary processes may explain how human beings developed reasoning abilities, but explaining the biological origin of reasoning does not explain the objective validity of the logical principles by which reasoning is judged. Natural selection favors reproductive success, not logical validity as an end in itself. Accurate beliefs may certainly contribute to survival, but truth and survival are not identical. The development of a useful cognitive mechanism therefore leaves a further philosophical question: why should its conclusions correspond to objective reality, and what ultimately grounds the standards by which those conclusions are judged?

An atheist might argue that logical laws are simply necessary abstract truths that require no divine foundation. This is a more serious response than the claim that logic is merely a product of evolution, but it still invites examination. What is the ultimate status of these abstract truths? Why do they possess authority over conscious reasoning? And how are they related to a physical world that is apparently intelligible to minds capable of grasping them?

From the Vaiṣṇava perspective, the difficulty arises because logic is being treated as independent of its ultimate source. Kṛṣṇa is the Supreme Intelligence, the source of all knowledge, and the foundation of reality. The living entities, being His conscious parts and parcels, possess limited cognitive capacities that depend upon Him. The rational order of the world and our ability to understand it therefore share a common divine foundation.

This explanation does not merely place God alongside logic as an additional fact about reality. Rather, it understands rational order as grounded in the eternal intelligence of the Supreme Person. We can reason because reality is intelligible, and reality is intelligible because its ultimate foundation is intelligence rather than mindless matter.

Now consider what happens when an atheist argues that God does not exist. He must already assume the validity of logic, distinguish true propositions from false ones, and trust his reasoning sufficiently to believe that his conclusions correspond to reality. From the Vaiṣṇava perspective, he is using faculties and principles that ultimately depend upon the very God he denies.

The same difficulty arises with morality. Human beings make judgments not merely about what they prefer, but about what ought and ought not to be done. We condemn cruelty, injustice, and dishonesty, frequently insisting that these things are wrong regardless of personal opinion. Yet an explanation of how moral dispositions evolved, or how particular moral conventions became established, is not the same as an explanation of why objective moral obligations exist. The fact that certain behavior is biologically advantageous or socially approved does not, by itself, make it morally right.

An atheist may defend objective moral truths independently of God, just as he may defend objective logical truths. But he must then explain what grounds their authority. On the Vaiṣṇava understanding, morality ultimately rests upon the Supreme Lord, and dharma is not a human invention but an expression of the divine order.

Likewise, our confidence in the external world presupposes that reality possesses intelligible regularities and that our minds can discover genuine truths about it. We trust perception, memory, inference, and the correspondence between thought and reality. Although particular perceptions and inferences can be mistaken, our attempts to correct them already presuppose standards of truth and rational justification.

Vaiṣṇava philosophy accounts for this relationship through the common origin of the knowing subject, the object of knowledge, and the intelligence through which knowledge becomes possible. All depend upon Kṛṣṇa.

None of these arguments suggests that atheists cannot reason, behave morally, or acquire knowledge. Obviously, they can. The challenge concerns the ultimate foundation of these activities. Nor does defining atheism as a mere absence of belief resolve the difficulty. Such a definition may describe someone’s conscious attitude toward God, but it does not establish that knowledge, logic, and morality can function independently of Him.

This is the presuppositional challenge we present to atheists: Explain how logic, objective truth, moral obligation, and reliable knowledge can ultimately make sense without God. It is not enough merely to point out that unbelievers use these things or to describe the mechanisms through which human beings acquire them. What requires explanation is their ultimate existence, validity, and authority.

Our argument is that Kṛṣṇa provides the necessary foundation for these realities, and that attempts to exclude Him must still rely upon the very rational and moral order He sustains. This is the force of the impossibility of the contrary. It is a philosophical argument for God’s necessity, not a claim that every question about logic or knowledge has already been conclusively settled by a single observation.

And this brings us back to our innate knowledge of God. If the fundamental principles upon which our thinking depends ultimately presuppose Kṛṣṇa, then our reliance upon those principles provides evidence consistent with the Vaiṣṇava teaching that knowledge of Him is inherent within us. Our conscious rejection of God does not eliminate that dependence. We may deny Him in words while continuing to live and reason within an order that, according to our argument, cannot exist without Him.

If We Already Know God, Why Do We Need Religious Education?

An obvious objection now arises. If knowledge of Kṛṣṇa is already inherent within us, why must we be taught about Him? Why do we need scriptures, spiritual masters, religious education, and devotional practices? Does the necessity of religious instruction not suggest that belief in God is something acquired rather than something inherent?

The answer becomes clearer when we consider how ordinary human knowledge develops. A child possesses natural capacities for language, but it does not enter the world speaking fluent Sanskrit, English, or Danish. These capacities require exposure, instruction, and practice before they develop into articulate linguistic knowledge. Likewise, children possess capacities for mathematical and logical reasoning long before they can formulate mathematical theorems or explain the laws of logic.

The infant examples discussed earlier illustrate this distinction. A newborn already distinguishes familiar experiences from unfamiliar ones. During the following months, children develop expectations concerning the identity and continued existence of objects. As their cognitive abilities develop further, they become capable of drawing elementary inferences, even before they possess the language required to explain what they are doing. Formal instruction comes later, when children learn to articulate and develop abilities they were already beginning to exercise.

We do not conclude that mathematics and logic are unnatural because children require education to develop their understanding of them. Nor do we ordinarily describe mathematics teachers as imposing mathematics upon children, as though mathematical truths were inventions of the teachers. Education enables children to develop their capacities and recognize truths that do not depend upon the teacher’s invention.

The need for instruction does not establish that the truth being taught is artificial.

The same distinction applies to knowledge of God, although the Vaiṣṇava understanding goes further. Ordinary education develops cognitive capacities and communicates information, whereas spiritual education also removes the covering that prevents the soul from recognizing what is already inherent within it. Śrīla Prabhupāda repeatedly explains that Kṛṣṇa consciousness is dormant within everyone’s heart and needs to be awakened. Hearing about Kṛṣṇa, chanting His holy names, associating with devotees, and receiving instruction through genuine disciplic succession therefore constitute a process of purification through which the conditioned soul gradually recovers awareness of its eternal relationship with Him.

We must distinguish between functioning through knowledge and consciously recognizing its ultimate foundation. A child may reason correctly without knowing what logic is, just as an adult may use mathematical principles without understanding their deeper foundations. Similarly, a conditioned soul may depend upon Kṛṣṇa for every act of cognition without consciously recognizing Him as its source. This explains why even a convinced atheist can reason, understand the world, and make moral judgments. His consciousness may be covered, but the faculties supplied and sustained by Kṛṣṇa remain operative.

Spiritual education does not create the soul’s relationship with Kṛṣṇa. It awakens the soul to a relationship that already exists. The fact that we require training to recognize Him is entirely consistent with the Vaiṣṇava understanding that our knowledge is inherent but presently covered by material conditioning.

What Does Science Tell Us?

Developmental psychology offers evidence consistent with important aspects of this argument. Research demonstrates that human cognition does not begin as a completely unstructured blank slate. Infants exhibit capacities to recognize distinctions, form expectations, and eventually draw inferences long before they can consciously articulate the principles involved.

In a 1980 study published in Science, Anthony DeCasper and William Fifer demonstrated that newborn infants preferred their mothers’ voices over those of other women. This provides an example of infants distinguishing between familiar and unfamiliar experiences from the beginning of life.

Research by Renée Baillargeon, published in 1987, found that infants as young as three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half months responded differently to physically possible and apparently impossible events involving hidden objects. These results suggested that infants possess early expectations about the continued existence of objects even when those objects are temporarily concealed.

Even more directly relevant to logical reasoning is a 2018 study in Science by Nicoló Cesana-Arlotti and colleagues. The researchers found evidence that 12- and 19-month-old infants could draw elementary inferences by eliminating alternatives. When an outcome contradicted the conclusion implied by the available information, the infants looked longer at the unexpected result. Subsequent research has found evidence of similar abilities in infants as young as ten months.

These findings do not mean that infants consciously understand formal logic. They suggest that important precursors of logical reasoning are already functioning before language and formal instruction.

Particularly interesting is the work of psychologist Deborah Kelemen. In her 2004 paper, Are Children “Intuitive Theists”?, she examined children’s tendency to interpret natural phenomena in terms of purpose and design. Her analysis suggested that describing young children as intuitive theists may have explanatory value because their explanations often involve purpose and nonhuman agency. This challenges the simplistic picture of children as naturally interpreting reality through an exclusively purposeless and impersonal framework until religious education introduces ideas of purpose and intelligence.

Scientific interpretations remain contested, however. A 2023 review by Ayse Payir and colleagues emphasizes the importance of cultural learning in children’s explicit beliefs about supernatural beings. This is compatible with the distinction between an underlying capacity or disposition and the conscious beliefs that develop through education and experience.

None of these findings scientifically proves that the eternal soul possesses knowledge of Kṛṣṇa. That conclusion rests upon Vaiṣṇava revelation and its philosophical understanding of consciousness. Nevertheless, the findings undermine the assumption that the inability to articulate a belief necessarily entails the absence of underlying knowledge or capacities. They also provide evidence that important structures of human cognition are operative before formal education.

The ultimate foundation of those structures remains a philosophical question. Science can investigate how cognitive abilities develop, but describing their development does not, by itself, establish why logical principles are valid, why truth is objective, or why reality is intelligible. These are precisely the questions addressed by the Vaiṣṇava presuppositional argument.

We Are Born Forgetful, Not Godless

The claim that everyone is born an atheist rests on a limited observation: newborn babies do not consciously articulate belief in God. But this observation does not establish that atheism is humanity’s original condition, that religious belief is unnatural, or that knowledge of God is merely the product of cultural conditioning. At most, it establishes that explicit religious beliefs are not yet available for conscious expression.

According to Vaiṣṇava philosophy, every soul eternally knows Kṛṣṇa and is related to Him. Material conditioning obscures this knowledge but cannot destroy the relationship upon which our very existence depends. The result is a condition in which we may sincerely believe that we know nothing about God, or even consciously deny His existence, while continuing to rely upon logic, truth, moral obligation, and an intelligible external world.

From the presuppositional perspective defended here, these are not independent realities that happen to coexist with God. They ultimately depend upon Him. Our reliance upon them therefore provides philosophical evidence supporting the Vaiṣṇava understanding that our knowledge of God is inherent, even when our conscious awareness of Him has become obscured.

We should not confuse this argument with a claim to have scientifically demonstrated unconscious belief in Kṛṣṇa. Rather, it combines the knowledge received through śāstra with a philosophical challenge to the worldview that attempts to understand human existence and knowledge independently of God.

The distinction between conscious recognition and prior dependence is especially important. A baby does not first learn the laws of logic and then begin functioning within an intelligible reality. Similarly, the soul does not first learn about Kṛṣṇa and then begin depending upon Him. In both cases, conscious understanding comes after the dependence is already present.

Religious education, properly understood, does not manufacture God or create our eternal relationship with Him. It reveals what we have forgotten. We are not born as souls without knowledge of God. We are eternal souls born into material bodies, having forgotten the God we have always known.

We may say that we do not believe in God, but we continue to live, think, and reason as though He exists. Our challenge to atheism is to explain how the very principles that make such thinking possible can ultimately be grounded without Him.